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This article expresses a note of caution regarding the general enthusiasm surrounding the duty of sincere
co-operation in the external relations of the European Union. It argues that according to the recent case
law of the European Court of Justice, the duty is in practice not only first and foremost incumbent upon
the Member States, but manifests itself as a strict duty to refrain from acting—a duty to remain
silent—rather than a duty of best endeavours. Tracing the Court’s key judgments in this regard (Inland
Waterways, IMO and PFOS), the authors conclude that in the presence of Union competence, but in the
absence of a (quasi)-authorisation by the Union institutions to act, the Member States are to remain idle.
While arguably necessary to safeguard the Union’s unity of international representation, this development
is prone to legally favour inaction and hinder the Union’s ambitions for actual “external action”.
Introduction
The duty of co-operation between the Member States of the European Union and the Union institutions
in external relations has become something of a mantra: it is often evoked by political leaders, has served
as a powerful argument before the Court of Justice (ECJ), and has been extensively discussed by scholars.
In all these different settings, the duty of co-operation is heralded rather enthusiastically as an important
goal in itself.
Among the most prominent examples, one could recall the President of the European, Council Herman
van Rompuy, in a speech delivered in Bruges shortly after his appointment, dwelling on the tension that
exists between the “whole” and the “parts” of the European Union on the international scene.1 He asked
metaphorically: “Are we all in the same ship, faring under the one European flag? Or are we 27 boats, all
steering their own national course?” According to the President, neither was the case, and that the “‘génie
européen’ is to invent ever new ways to deal with this tension”. The image he used to express this
relationship was that of a convoy of 27 ships connected under the waterline, making it impossible for
them to “sail away from the others just like that”.2
In the legal sphere, the ECJ stresses that the duty of co-operation,
*The authors express their gratitude to the organisers of the “After Lisbon: The Future of European Law & Policy”
conference hosted by the Institute of European Law at the University of Birmingham in June 2010, where the first
draft of this paper was presented and discussed.
1Reproduced in H. van Rompuy, “The Challenges for Europe in a Changing World” [2010] College of Europe EU
Diplomacy Papers 3.
2Van Rompuy, “The Challenges for Europe” [2010] College of Europe EU Diplomacy Papers 3, 13.
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“is of general application and does not depend either onwhether the Community competence concerned
is exclusive or on any right of the Member States to enter into obligations towards non-member
countries.”3
Its rationale is nothing less than “to facilitate the achievement of the Community tasks and to ensure the
coherence and consistency of the action and its international representation”.4
Eminent scholars of European Union in turn revert to rather lofty imagery to grasp the duty of
co-operation. For von Bogdandy, for instance, given that the Union’s legal order,
“ultimately rests on the voluntary obedience of its Member States … the principle of loyalty has a
key role in generating solutions to open questions and thus containing conflicts that may arise in a
polycentric and diverse polity.”5
This is all the more true in the realm of external relations, where the call for a “single voice” (and the
hackneyed metaphor of Kissinger’s single European “phone number”) have long been pervasive features
of the debate. Picking up the acoustic imagery, Hillion’s references to “the polyphonic nature of the
Union’s external action whose audibility ultimately depends on the degree of harmony achieved among
its key players”6 makes one think of the European Union as a choir singing with (at least) 27 voices.
Moreover, Cremona describes theMember States as “trustees of the Community interest”,7while Neframi
even goes as far as proclaiming the transformation from the status “of sovereign States into that of Member
States of the European Union”.8
In this article, we would like to issue a note of caution. In tracing the interpretation of the duty of
co-operation in external relations by the Court in its recent case law, we detect two elements which might
curb the general enthusiasm vis-à-vis this principle. First, the judgments of the Court are directed in the
first place against theMember States, condemning them for a variety of acts conducted on the international
scene. In these cases, instead of speaking up, the Court tells them that they should have remained silent.
This is why it appears to us that the duty of co-operation, as interpreted by the Court, means first and
foremost a “duty to remain silent” (as opposed to the proverbial “right to remain silent” in criminal law).
Secondly, we wonder to which extent this creates a tension with the ambitious foreign policy programme
of the Union, captured by the Lisbon Treaty term of “external action”. How active can you be, if you
cannot speak up, or can just act as backing vocals of the European Commission’s solo performance? Those
considerations also lead to reconsidering the international role of the Member States, which then appears
a lot less illustrious. Telling here is the expression the Advocate General used in PFOS, comparingMember
States with “lemmings heading towards the edge of a cliff”.9 Even if this image was used to express
understanding for the frustration that compliance with the duty of co-operation can cause Member States,
3Commission v Germany (Inland Waterways) (C-433/03) [2005] E.C.R. I-6985 at [58].
4Commission v Germany (C-433/03) [2005] E.C.R. I-6985 at [60]; on “the requirement of unity in the international
representation of the Community” see alreadyOpinion 1/94 on Competence of the Community to conclude international
agreements concerning services and the protection of intellectual property [1994] E.C.R. I-5267 at [108].
5A. von Bogdandy, “Founding Principles” in A. von Bogdandy and J. Bast, Principles of European Constitutional
Law, 2nd edn (Oxford: Hart/Munich: C.H. Beck, 2010), p.42; see also extensively A. Hatje, Loyalität als Rechtsprinzip
der Europäischen Union (Baden-Baden: Nomos, 2001).
6C. Hillion, “Mixity and coherence in EU External Relations: The significance of the ‘duty of cooperation’” in C.
Hillion and P. Koutrakos (eds),Mixed Agreements Revisited (Oxford: Hart, 2010), p.87; see also C. Hillion, “Tous
pour un, Un pour tous! Coherence in the External relations of the European Union” inM. Cremona (ed.),Developments
in EU External Relations Law (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2008), p.27.
7M. Cremona, “Member States as trustees of the Community interest: participating in international agreements on
behalf of the European Community” [2009] EUI Working Paper (Law) 17.
8E. Neframi, “The Duty of Loyalty: Rethinking its Scope through its Application in the Field of EU External
Relations” (2010) 47 C.M.L.R. 323, 323.
9Commission v Sweden (PFOS) (C-246/07) April 4, 2010, Opinion of A.G. Maduro at [58].
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the contrast between the harmonious choir and the trustees of the Union interest, on the one hand, and a
flock of animals not known for their intelligence and gracefulness, on the other hand, is undeniable.
In order to elaborate our argument, after a look at the duty as it is set out in earlier case law and as it
now stands under the post-Lisbon Treaty on European Union (TEU), the main part of this article examines
recent developments in the ECJ’s case law, followed by a number of observations concerning the “special”
Common Foreign and Security Policy (CFSP) in this context. Moving towards a “duty to remain silent”,
these cases of the last few years reveal the extent of the Court’s interpretation of the duty of co-operation,
an interpretation through which the EU Member States’ co-operation with the EU institutions has come
to mean refraining from acting virtually regardless of competence questions and regardless of whether
the EU institutions have decided to act at all.
The duty of sincere co-operation in the Treaty and previous case law
Before we examine the specific key cases concerning the duty of sincere co-operation, it is necessary to
recall first the provision itself, and its different manifestations. Article 4(3) of the TEU reads as follows:
“Pursuant to the principle of sincere cooperation, the Union and the Member States shall, in full
mutual respect, assist each other in carrying out tasks which flow from the Treaties. The Member
States shall take any appropriate measure, general or particular, to ensure fulfillment of the obligations
arising out of the Treaties or resulting from the acts of the institutions of the Union. The Member
States shall facilitate the achievement of the Union’s tasks and refrain from any measure which could
jeopardise the attainment of the Union’s objectives.”
Its predecessor, before the entry into force of the Lisbon Treaty, was the “duty of cooperation”, which
could be found in art.10 of the Treaty Establishing the European Community (TEC). The wording before
and after Lisbon differs in two important respects.10 First, while old art.10 TEC was just addressed at the
Member States, art.4(3) TEU, at least in the first sentence, turns this duty into a two-way street, obliging
in principle both the Union and the Member States, thereby codifying the Court’s previous case law.11
Secondly, with the absorption of the Community into the Union, now the more comprehensive “Union
objectives” are to be furthered, and not only those of what used to be the “first pillar”.12
This provision has been characterised in many ways. According to scholarship, it represents a qualified
expression of the pacta sunt servanda principle,13 a federal principle14 or a multi-faceted legal principle
10See A. von Bogdandy and S. Schill, “Artikel 4 EUV” in E. Grabitz, M. Hilf and M. Nettesheim (eds), Das Recht
der Europäischen Union, looseleaf version of the 41st supplement, July 2010 (Munich: C.H. Beck 2010), paras 48–49;
and von Bogdandy, “Founding Principles” in Principles of European Constitutional Law, 2010, pp.41–42.
11The Court had already recognised that art.10 TEC imposed on both the Member States and the Union institutions
mutual duties of co-operation. See already Luxembourg v Parliament (230/81) [1983] E.C.R. 255 at [38]; Zwartveld,
Re (C-2/88) [1990] E.C.R. I-4405; [1990] 3 C.M.L.R. 457 at [10]; Stergios Delimitis v Henninger Bräu (C-234/89)
[1991] E.C.R. I-935 at [53]; [1992] 5 C.M.L.R. 210; and more recently Staat der Nederlanden (Ministerie van
Landbouw, Natuurbeheer en Visserij) v Ten Kate Holding Musselkanaal BV (C-511/03) [2005] E.C.R. I-8979; [2006]
1 C.M.L.R. 50 at [28].
12This, too, can be seen as a codification of the Court’s case law, as it had already applied a similar duty of
co-operation within the former “third pillar” (police and judicial co-operation in criminal matters). See, e.g. Criminal
Proceedings against Pupino (C-105/03) [2005] E.C.R. I-5285; [2005] 2 C.M.L.R. 63 at [42]; and Gestoras Pro
Amnistía v Council of the European Union (C-354/04) [2007] E.C.R. I-1579; [2007] 2 C.M.L.R. 22 at [52].
13P. Koutrakos, EU International Relations Law (Oxford: Hart 2006), pp.184–185.
14G. De Baere, Constitutional Principles of EU External Relations (Oxford: Oxford University Press 2008), p.253;
similarly, using the term “federative principle”, M. Zuleeg, “The Advantages of the European Constitution” in
Principles of European Constitutional Law, 2010, pp.774–775; and, employing the term “principle of ‘federal good
faith’”, H. Schermers and D. Waelbroeck, Judicial Protection in the European Union, 6th edn (The Hague: Kluwer
2001), pp.625–627. See also Schermers and Waelbroeck, Judicial Protection in the European Union, 2001, p.112.
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in the service of coherence15 and effectiveness,16 which externally culminates in the requirement of unity
in the international representation of the Union. Scholars have derived these classifications of the duty
from its different manifestations as laid down by the Court in its case law. They include both obligations
to act and obligations to refrain from acting.17 Prominent examples for duties incumbent on the Member
States would be, for the former case, the obligation to inform and consult,18 and for the latter an obligation
to desist from ratifying certain international agreements with third countries.19
The two kinds of obligations dovetail with more fundamental understandings of the duty of co-operation
either as general obligation of “best efforts” regarding the conduct of the Member States and the EU
Institutions, or as a clear-cut result, that is for the Member States not to act. The former represents the
inter-institutional decorum aimed at minimising the “continuous squabbling between the different subjects
of EU external action”.20 From this perspective it might even be possible, as Kuijper put it,
“that the breach of procedural rules in the field of external relations … could be excused in the light
ofMember State behaviour that in the circumstances was correct from the point of view of Community
loyalty.”21
We argue here that if this “best endeavours” understanding was not altogether prevalent in the case law
of the Court, prior to the string of cases starting with Inland Waterways, it was at least the most probable
interpretation, as the Court until then had desisted from pointing to any clear obligations of result flowing
from the duty of co-operation, let alone a “duty to remain silent”.
The “best endeavours” view was captured well by Advocate General Tesauro in the Hermès case:
“To fulfil the obligation of cooperation and the requirement of unity in the international representation
of the Community … it is essential to ensure close cooperation between the Member States and the
Community institutions, both in the process of negotiation and conclusion of the agreements on the
subject and, even more important, in the fulfilment of the commitments entered into. In short, they
must endeavour to adopt a common position.”22
15B. Van Vooren, “A Paradigm for Coherence in EU External Relations Law: The European Neighbourhood
Policy”, PhD Thesis, European University Institute (2010), pp.105–106.
16Neframi, “The Duty of Loyalty” (2010) 47 C.M.L. Rev. 323, 359; also S. Hyett, “The duty of cooperation: a
flexible concept” in A. Dashwood and C. Hillion (eds), The General Law of EC External Relations (London: Sweet
& Maxwell, 2000).
17Von Bogdandy and Schill, “Artikel 4 EUV” in Das Recht der Europäischen Union, loose-leaf, 2010, marginal
no.59; and Schermers and Waelbroeck, Judicial Protection in the European Union, 2001, pp.113–115.
18France v United Kingdom (141/78) [1979] E.C.R. 2923; [1980] 1 C.M.L.R. 6 at [9] in the area of fisheries; see
also laterMOX Plant (C-459/03) [2006] E.C.R. I-4635; [2006] 2 C.M.L.R. 59 at [179]. This case, however, is already
more ambiguous, as also the exclusive jurisdiction of the ECJ (i.e. the prohibition to seek adjudication elsewhere)
was at stake.
19Commission v Luxembourg (Inland Waterways) (C-266/03) [2005] E.C.R. I-4805 at [66]; and Commission v
Germany (C-433/03) [2005] E.C.R. I-6985 at [73]. Whether informing and consulting could have salvaged the breach
is not entirely clear from the wording of the judgment (see next section).
20C. Timmermans, “Organising Joint Participation of E.C. andMember States” in The General Law of E.C. External
Relations, 2000, p.243.
21P.J. Kuijper, “Re-Reading External Relations Cases in the Field of Transport: The Function of Community
Loyalty” in M. Bulterman et al. (eds), Views of European Law from the Mountain (Alphen aan den Rijn: Wolters
Kluwer Law & Business, 2009), p.295; similarly von Bogdandy and Schill, “Artikel 4 EUV” in Das Recht der
Europäischen Union, 2010, margin No.96. These interpretations also bolster the idea that informing and consulting
as such should not be understood as “results”. They constitute ongoing efforts, not a one-time exercise that can be
achieved through simple notification or an exchange of letters.
22Hermès International v FHT Marketing Choice BV (C-53/96) [1998] E.C.R. I-3603, Opinion of A.G. Teasuaro
at [21] (emphasis added). The Court, however, did not pick up the co-operation argument in its judgment.
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As to the position of the Court, it routinely characterised the duty of co-operation through general statements
in favour of inter-institutional co-operation without specifying the concrete results required to achieve
that co-operation. In its first pronouncement on the external face of the duty of co-operation, the Court
used it as a means of managing the division of competences between the European Union and its Member
States when concluding the Convention on the Physical protection of Nuclear Material within the
EURATOM Treaty. In Ruling 1/78, the Court acknowledged that the implementation of that convention
entailed close co-operation between the institutions and theMember States.23However, it did not lay down
the shape the co-operation ought to take. Instead, the ECJ clearly defined the areas of the international
agreement which should be implemented by the European Union and those parts which should be
implemented by the Member States according to the division of competences.24 In Ruling 1/78 the Court
appeared to consider the duty of co-operation fulfilledwhen both the EU and itsMember States implemented
their respective parts of the international agreement they had concluded.
In its case law following Ruling 1/78, the Court continued to refer to the duty of co-operation in terms
of the management of EU external relations, without laying down how exactly this should play out. For
instance, in Opinion 2/91 the Court continued to acknowledge that in those areas in which the European
Union and its Member States share competences,
“it is important to ensure that there is a close association between the institutions of the Community
and the Member States both in the process of negotiation and conclusion and in the fulfilment of the
obligations entered into.”25
In Opinion 2/91, in contrast with Ruling 1/78 in which both the European Union and its Member States
concluded the agreement, the international agreement at stake (Convention No.170 of the International
Labour Organization concerning safety in the use of chemicals at work) could not be concluded by the
European Union as it was only open to states, even though it had competence to do so.26 The Court took
notice of this fact and declared that in such situations where the European Union cannot accede to an
international agreement, but its Member States can, “cooperation between the Community and theMember
States is all the more necessary” where the Union must act “through the medium of the Member States”.27
However, as was the case in Ruling 1/78, the ECJ did not explicitly mention how to achieve that
co-operation in practice. The Court left it to the EU institutions and the Member States to take all the
measures necessary so as best to ensure such co-operation regarding the ratification as well as in the
implementation of the international agreement.28 It refrained from indicating any specific measures required
to ensure that co-operation.
In subsequent instances, the Court continued to give a great degree of flexibility and scope of manoeuvre
to the EU institutions and its Member States on how to ensure close co-operation in their external relations.
In Opinion 1/94 the Court once again stressed the importance of the duty of co-operation in the
implementation of an international agreement. Opinion 1/94 concerned the competences involved in the
conclusion of the Uruguay Round agreements (on the occasion of the setting-up of the World Trade
Organization), more specifically the GATS and TRIPS Agreements. At the hearing, the Commission drew
23Ruling 1/78 on Draft Convention on the Physical Protection of Nuclear Materials, Facilities and Transports [1978]
E.C.R. 2151 at [36].
24Ruling 1/78 on Draft Convention on the Physical Protection of Nuclear Materials [1978] E.C.R. 2151 at [36].
25Opinion 2/91 on Convention No.170 of the International Labour Organization concerning safety in the use of
chemicals at work [1993] E.C.R. I-1061 at [36].
26Opinion 2/91 on Convention No. 170 of the International Labour Organization [1993] E.C.R. I-1061 at [39]. See
generally on this problem I. Govaere, J. Capiau and A. Vermeersch, “In-Between Seats: the Participation of the
European Union in International Organizations” (2004) 9 European Foreign Affairs Review 155.
27Opinion 2/91 on Convention No. 170 of the International Labour Organization [1993] E.C.R. I-1061 at [37].
28Opinion 2/91 on Convention No.170 of the International Labour Organization [1993] E.C.R. I-1061 at [38].
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the attention of the Court to the problems that would arise as regards the implementation and management
of the agreements if the Court (as it later did) recognised shared competence in the conclusion of these
agreements.29 Following its previous case law, the Court noted that the duty of co-operation played a
central role in the administration of international agreements and in ensuring the unity of international
representation of the European Union.30 In particular, the ECJ acknowledged the “imperative” importance
of co-operation in the concrete case of the adoption of suspension of concessions (retaliatory trademeasures)
by the European Union and its Member States towards third states in the framework of WTO dispute
settlement system.31 However, it continued to refrain from indicating concrete means through which the
co-operation would be achieved.
The great degree of flexibility that Opinion 2/91 and Opinion 1/94 accorded the EU and its Member
States in achieving their mutual duties of co-operation had as their main consequence the proliferation of
codes of conduct, inter-institutional agreements and other soft-law mechanisms aimed at establishing
modus vivendi (or rather: modus co-operandi) between them.32 One of these mechanisms was the
Arrangement concluded between the Council and the Commission regarding the preparation for Food and
Agricultural Organization meetings, statements and voting (FAO Arrangement). In relation to the FAO
Arrangement, the Commission brought an action against a Council decision to give the Member States
the right to vote in the FAO for the adoption of the Agreement to Promote Compliance with International
Conservation and Management Measures by Fishing Vessels.33 The Commission and the Council had
diverging interpretations regarding the rules of the FAO Arrangement in terms of voting rights on the
particular subject covered by the Agreement. The FAO Arrangement provided detailed rules on who is
to vote on a particular subject by looking at the competence involved. If the subject areas covered fell
under the European Union’s exclusive competence, the European Union would enjoy the right to vote.
On the contrary, if the subject of the FAO measure fell within Member States’ competence, they would
have the right to vote. On issues falling within shared competence, depending on whether the main “thrust”
of the issue lies in an area outside the European Union’s exclusive competence it would be for theMember
States or the European Union to vote.34 According to the ECJ, by establishing rules on who is to vote,
speak or attend to meetings in the FAO, the European Union and its Member States met their respective
duties of co-operation and ensured that the unity of international representation was achieved.35 However,
the Court still remained silent on how to attain co-operation in the context of those agreements in which
there is no inter-institutional agreement provided or whether the absence of an explicit arrangement
establishing a framework for that co-operation would constitute a contrario a breach of the duty of
co-operation.
These previous cases show how until recently the Court’s position on the duty of co-operation was
based on a rather abstract understanding of it. The Court did not establish any kind of concrete obligations
of result. It just mentioned the relevance of co-operation in achieving both the effectiveness of EU law
and the unity of international representation, pointing out that inter-institutional arrangements like the
FAO Arrangement were an expression of that duty. The vagueness on how the duty operates in practice
appears as a common thread running through all the case law until then. Consequently, this silence regarding
29Opinion 1/94 Competence of the Community to conclude international agreements concerning services and the
protection of intellectual property [1994] E.C.R. I-5267 at [106].
30Opinion 1/94 Competence of the Community to conclude international agreements [1994] E.C.R. I-5267 at [108].
31Opinion 1/94 Competence of the Community to conclude international agreements [1994] E.C.R. I-5267 at [109].
32 I. MacLeod, I.D. Henry, and S. Hyett, The External Relations of the European Communities (Oxford: Clarendon,
1996), p.150.
33Commission v Council (C-25/94) [1996] E.C.R. I-1469 at [1].
34Commission v Council (C-25/94) [1996] E.C.R. I-1469 at [7].
35Commission v Council (C-25/94) [1996] E.C.R. I-1469 at [49].
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the concrete obligations which the duty of co-operation entailed led some authors to argue that these would
not be obligations of result but indeed of “best endeavours”, especially in areas of shared competence.36
Against this backdrop, the more recent case law to which we will turn in the next section, which clearly
outlines the manifestations of the duty of co-operation as unambiguous obligations of result, i.e. of instances
where Member States should have refrained from acting, is to be seen as a rather drastic evolution of the
duty of co-operation—more drastic than this previous case lawmight have suggested. Starting with Inlands
Waterways, the Court issued judgments turning from general statements on the necessity of co-operating
externally to proclaiming as inconsistent with the duty an increasing range ofMember State acts. Whatever
prevailing narratives of “best efforts” may have been entertained previously, loyalty to the Union on the
international scene is now revealed as being largely a duty of negative results—a “duty to remain silent”.
Limitless loyalty?—the way towards the “duty to remain silent”
In view of a number of recent judgments of the ECJ, this article argues that we are witnessing a growing
tendency towards legally prohibiting a growing category of Member State actions in the external sphere.
The Court is now more clearly providing an interpretation in which the duty of co-operation represents
an obligation of negative results. This imposes a stricter duty on the Member States, going beyond “trying
hard” in order to co-operate with each other and the EU institutions, notably the Commission. The scope
of such an obligation of result appears to be surprisingly wide. This section examines how the ECJ has
broadened the duty of co-operation in the course of three milestone cases: Inland Waterways, IMO and
PFOS.
The Inland Waterways cases: can informing and consulting be enough?
The Inland Waterways judgments of mid-200537 arguably mark the starting-point in the way towards the
“duty to remain silent”. They are important in two respects. First, they clarified the point in time from
when there exists a Union position that Member States are prohibited from compromising. In that respect,
they go further than the ground-breaking ERTA judgment,38 which concerned affecting common rules by
actually concluding an international agreement with third countries. Here, the Court scrutinises acts
preceding conclusion. Secondly, however, in terms of the concrete legal obligations ensuing from the
duty of co-operation, the Court still shows some flexibility at this stage.
In these cases, the Commission brought two separate infringement proceedings against Germany and
Luxembourg in the context of the negotiation of a multilateral agreement concerning transport on inland
waterways by the Community. Germany and Luxembourg did not interrupt their own respective bilateral
treaty-making processes with third countries after the Commission had received a mandate to negotiate a
36SeeMacLeod, Henry and Hyett, The External Relations of the European Communities, 1996, p.150. Interestingly,
Söllner, writing in 1985, even rejected a duty of consultation in cases other than exclusive competence: R. Söllner,
Art. 5 EWG-Vertrag in der Rechtsprechung des Europäischen Gerichtshofes (Munich: V. Florentz, 1985), pp.59–61.
Dauses, writing in 1980, acknowledges a general duty of consultation, but does not seeMember States as being barred
from continuing negotiations with third countries in areas where the Union (then Community) has not exercised its
competence yet. A duty to refrain from concluding such an agreement, according to Dauses, might only exist in very
particular cases. M. Dauses, “Rechtliche Probleme der Abgrenzung der Vertragsschlußbefugnis der EG und der
Mitgliedstaaten und die Auswirkung der verschiedenen Abgrenzungsmodelle” in G. Ress (ed.), Souveränitätsverständnis
in den Europäischen Gemeinschaften (Baden-Baden: Nomos, 1980), pp.179–180.
37Commission v Luxembourg (C-266/03) [2005] E.C.R. I-4805; and Commission v Germany (C-433/03) [2005]
E.C.R. I-6985.
38Commission v Council (ERTA) (22/70) [1971] E.C.R. 263; [1971] C.M.L.R. 335.
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multilateral inland waterways transport agreement including the same third countries.39 Even though no
Community agreement had been concluded yet, the ECJ ruled that Germany and Luxembourg had breached
the duty of co-operation insofar as they did not abstain from any initiative likely to compromise the proper
conduct of the negotiations initiated at Community level. In particular, they had not abandoned the
ratification of agreements with third countries already initialled or signed, and had not forgone the opening
of further negotiations with certain countries of Central and Eastern Europe (which at the time were not
yet EU members) relating to inland waterway transport.
The ECJ thus established that the application of the duty of co-operation already applies from the
moment the Council gives a mandate to the Commission to negotiate. In the Court’s words:
“The adoption of a decision authorising the Commission to negotiate a multilateral agreement on
behalf of the Community marks the start of a concerted Community action at international level.”40
The ECJ underlines the importance of the existence of a concerted Community position as the rationale
which triggers the application of the duty of co-operation. Since the Council (as the body in which the
Member States are represented) has agreed to set in motion the Union procedure, the fact that some of its
members decide to undermine a decision taken there denotes a lack of co-operating spirit, not only towards
the EU institutions, but also to the other Member States. A Member State which has participated in the
decision-making process for setting a particular common course of action cannot disregard that process
and go on to act independently. In other words, the duty of co-operation entails that Member States cannot
deviate from the Union process when the decision which sets it in motion does not suit them.
However, as to the precise content of the duties that are imposed on the Member States from that
moment, the Court still shows a certain degree of flexibility. It ruled that for the purpose of the concerted
Community action:
“The adoption of a decision authorising the Commission to negotiate … requires … if not a duty of
abstention on the part of the Member States, at the very least a duty of close cooperation between
the latter and the Community institutions in order to facilitate the achievement of the Community
tasks and to ensure the coherence and consistency of the action and its international representation.”41
In this situation it would have seemed possible to apply straight away to the Member States a strict duty
to refrain from acting, i.e. halt (or reverse) the treaty-making process. However, the Court did not yet go
as far as to state that this manifestation of the duty would apply in this particular case. Importantly, the
Court concluded that “having negotiated, concluded, ratified and brought into force the contested bilateral
agreements without having cooperated or consulted with the Commission”42 led to the failure to comply
with the duty. This shows us first of all the paramount importance that the Commission assumes as the
Union (then Community) negotiator, once the Council has established a common course of action.
Nevertheless, this formulation could also be interpreted as meaning that the acts as such of negotiating,
concluding and ratifying the agreement were not the problem. Arguably, the two Member States were
held responsible essentially for breaching the duty to inform and consult.43The logic behind it is, a contrario,
that had Luxembourg duly informed and consulted the Commission about its intention of negotiating,
39For a summary of the facts of the case see Commission v Luxembourg (C-266/03) [2005] E.C.R. I-4805 at
[16]-[24]; Commission v Germany (C-433/03) [2005] E.C.R. I-6985 at [16]–[24].
40Commission v Germany (C-433/03) [2005] E.C.R. I-6985 at [66]; Commission v Luxembourg (C-266/03) [2005]
E.C.R. I-4805 at [60].
41Commission v Germany (C-433/03) [2005] E.C.R. I-6985 at [66]; Commission v Luxembourg (C-266/03) [2005]
E.C.R. I-4805 at [60].
42Commission v Luxembourg (C-266/03) [2005] E.C.R. I-4805 at [66] (emphasis added); see also [61].
43See De Baere, Constitutional Principles of EU External Relations (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2008),
p.256.
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concluding, ratifying and implementing those bilateral agreements, the Commission would have warned
that Member State on the possible breach of the duty of co-operation that those actions would entail.
Hence one could still say that the ECJ meant that the content of the duty of co-operation, once a Union
position on the issue has been taken, encompasses a duty of striving for close co-operation, and not
necessarily a duty to abstain from acting altogether.44
It this context, it should be mentioned that the ECJ followed a similar approach regarding the duty of
co-operation in the 2006MOX Plant judgment. Ireland had not consulted the Commission of its intention
to bring a dispute before international arbitration concerning an area falling within the scope of EU law.
The ECJ ruled that Ireland had violated, in addition to the exclusive jurisdiction of the ECJ, its duty to
inform and consult the Commission in such a situation.45
Therefore we argue that at that time there was—in theory—still scope for the Member States to comply
with the duty of co-operation if they had informed and consulted with the EU institutions prior to acting
externally. However, a closer look at the details of the Inland Waterways judgment concerning Germany
reveals a certain ambiguity as regards actual practice. Importantly, as the Court acknowledged, in contrast
to Luxembourg, Germany had indeed consulted with the Commission at the time of the negotiation and
conclusion of its bilateral agreements with the third countries. But these consultations took place before
the adoption of the decision authorising the Commission to negotiate an agreement on the topic.46Germany
was formally complying with its duty of co-operation before its application was actually triggered, but
was breaching it later on since it did not consult the Commission before the ratification of the agreements.
As the Court put it:
“It is common ground that after that date the Federal Republic of Germany proceeded to ratify and
implement those agreements without cooperating or consulting with the Commission.”47
As a consequence:
“By acting in that manner, that Member State jeopardised the implementation of the Council Decision
of 7 December 1992 and, consequently, the accomplishment of the Community’s task and the
attainment of the objectives of the Treaty.”48
It appears that—theoretical considerations aside—in reality when the ECJ speaks here about the duty to
inform and consult it means that Member States must refrain from acting unless the Commission has
authorised it. The Court’s reference to the gentleman’s agreement between the Commission and the Council
concerning these negotiations bolster this interpretation. The agreement provides,
“that ‘the Commission shall be the spokesman during the negotiations, and the representatives of the
Member States shall speak only if requested to do so by the Commission’ and that ‘the representatives
of the Member States must take no action which is likely to handicap the Commission in its work’.”49
44SeeM. Cremona, “Defending the Community Interest: the Duties of Cooperation and Compliance” inM. Cremona
and B. De Witte (eds), EU Foreign Relations Law: Constitutional Fundamentals (Oxford: Hart Publishing, 2008),
p.163; as well as Hillion, “Mixity and coherence in EU External Relations” inMixed Agreements Revisited, 2010,
pp.99–100.
45MOX Plant (439/03) [2006] E.C.R. I-4635 at [179]–[181]. Note that breaching the exclusive jurisdiction of the
ECJ stipulated in then art.292 TEC (now art. 344 TFEU) was described by the Court as “a specific expression of
Member States’ more general duty of loyalty resulting from Article 10 EC” at [169]. Whether any particular efforts
could have “justified” bypassing the Court’s exclusive jurisdiction, however, is highly doubtful.
46Commission v Germany (C-433/03) [2005] E.C.R. I-6985 at [68].
47Commission v Germany (C-433/03) [2005] E.C.R. I-6985 at [68].
48Commission v Germany (C-433/03) [2005] E.C.R. I-6985 at [69].
49Commission v Germany (C-433/03) [2005] E.C.R. I-6985 at [70], quoting Title II, para.3(d), of the Gentleman’s
Agreement.
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Thus, would having informed and consulted with the Commission once again after the start of concerted
Community action really have salvaged Germany’s behaviour of continuing down the road with its bilateral
agreements? What in fact constituted the real handicap to the Commission’s work: Germany’s lacking
communication, or indeed the fact that Germany acted—spoke, if you will—”without being requested to
do so by the Commission”? In the authors’ view, the German branch of the Inland Waterways cases shows
that it is for all practical purposes not enough forMember States to inform and consult with the Commission.
In fact, what the Court still presents here as potentially a duty to inform and consult in reality leads to an
obligation to refrain from acting.
In sum, while in theory the ECJ in these two cases ruled that Member States have, “if not a duty of
abstention”, a duty to inform and consult the EU institutions (in concreto the Commission) before acting
externally when the latter have adopted a position on a certain issue, in practice, the Court interpreted the
duty to inform and consult in such a way that in reality Member States at the end must provide a clear
result. In this case, the result would have been to halt the ongoing bilateral negotiations and/or undo
commitments already entered into, in addition to the continuous duty to abstain from approaching any
new commitments.
The IMO case: abstention in areas of exclusive competence
The next milestone on the way to the “duty to remain silent” is the IMO judgment of February 2009. The
importance of the judgment lies in two aspects. First, it expands further the notion of the “start of a
concerted Community action”. Consequently, it has become very hard to tell when there is definitely no
Union position at all, and therefore when Member States would still be free to act. Secondly, it removes
the ambiguity on the nature of the duty of co-operation that still existed in Inland Waterways. It made
clear that, in order to comply with the duty, at least in the area of exclusive Union competence, what is
required is unequivocal abstention—or silence—on the part of the Member States. No information and
consultation efforts could suffice to justify breaking this silence here.
In the IMO case, the Commission brought an infringement procedure against Greece for having submitted
a non-binding proposal for consideration to a committee of the InternationalMaritime Organisation (IMO)
regarding maritime safety, an issue falling within European Union’s exclusive competence.50 The action
was successful, as the ECJ found that Greece had violated its duty of co-operation by acting in this way.
The special feature of the case is that the IMO is an international organisation to which the European
Union is not a party, but all EU Member States are.51 Therefore the European Union (most likely through
the Commission) could not have made that proposal itself. If the European Union wants to act within the
IMO it has to do it through its Member States “acting jointly in the Community’s interest”.52 The European
Union’s exclusive competence, on the one hand, and the lack of membership in the IMO, on the other
hand, create thus a situation in which Member States are the “trustees”53 of the Union interest in that
international organisation. If Member States want to act within the IMO, logically, they should inform
and consult the EU institutions since their actions could jeopardise the European Union’s objectives. As
in Opinion 2/91, the duty of co-operation enters the picture as the structuring principle for overcoming
the problems derived from the European Union’s lack of membership of certain international organisations.
While the EU institutions need to co-operate with Member States so the latter are not put in a difficult
50For the background see Commission v Greece (IMO) (C-45/07) [2009] E.C.R. I-701; [2009] 2 C.M.L.R. 38 at
[1]–[10].
51See M. Cremona, “Extending the reach of the AETR principle: Comment on Commission v Greece (C-45/07)”
(2009) 34 E.L.R. 754, 754.
52 IMO (C-45/07) [2009] E.C.R. I-701 at [31]; see also Opinion 2/91 on Convention No.170 of the International
Labour Organization concerning safety in the use of chemicals at work [1993] E.C.R. I-1061 at [5].
53See Cremona, “Member States as trustees of the Community interest” [2009] EUI Working Paper (Law) 17.
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position within the IMO, Member States need to co-operate with the European Union so as to allow the
European Union to be heard in the IMO regardless of its formal absence there.
In this particular case, Greece had in fact previously tried to discuss its non-binding proposal in the
appropriate EU forum. Greece had submitted it to the “Marsec” (Maritime Safety) Committee so a Union
position on the issue could emerge there.54 In other words, Greece tried to initiate a concerted Union action
to be pursued at the international level. The Commission, as the agenda-setter in the committee, refused
to put the proposal on the agenda and so prevented it from being discussed within the committee. After
the Commission’s refusal, Greece considered that it had complied with its duty of co-operation. It had
done everything in its hands to forge a Union position on the issue, and certainly had complied in terms
of information and consultation. Greece perceived that it had shown its “best endeavours”, and thus had
complied with the duty of co-operation in this situation.55
The ECJ did not share Greece’s view. According to the Court, in a situation in which the Greek proposal
concerned issues falling under EU’s exclusive competence, the duty of co-operation entails a duty to
refrain from acting, not just a Member State’s best efforts, and applies regardless of what had occurred
internally in the EU bodies. According to the Court, the crucial point is that Greece “initiate[d] a procedure
which could lead to the adoption by the IMO of new rules”.56 Consequently, Greece “took an initiative
likely to affect the provisions of the Regulation [on enhancing ship and port facility security], which is
an infringement of the obligations under Article 10 EC [now 4.3 TEU] … .”57
The ECJ thus links EU’s exclusive competence in this area to the duty to refrain from acting: whenever
there is exclusive competence on an issue, Member States cannot act independently anymore.58 The Court’s
view would be consistent with what it had argued formally in the Inland Waterways cases. In those cases,
it did not accept that the agreements fell under the European Union’s exclusive competence.59 Thus the
application of the less strict duty to inform and consult was still conceivable there instead of the duty to
refrain from acting (at least in principle).
Leaving aside the question whether non-legal or pre-legal items can be subject to the ERTA effect,60 the
case establishes that Member States, even in situations in which they unsuccessfully tried to set in motion
the Union procedure, are precluded from making a proposal internationally on their own motion. This is
even the case where the European Union, acting through its institutions, did not respond or did not wish
to respond to a Member State’s initiative. Here, the duty to refrain from acting is applied in absolute terms
by the Court. Greece has to comply with its duty of abstention even if the EU institutions have failed to
comply with their duty of co-operation:
54 IMO (C-45/07) [2009] E.C.R. I-701, Opinion of A.G. Bot at [16].
55See Cremona, “Extending the reach of the AETR principle” (2009) 34 E.L.R. 754, 757.
56 IMO (C-45/07) [2009] E.C.R. I-701 at [21].
57 IMO (C-45/07) [2009] E.C.R. I-701 at [23].
58Cremona, “Extending the reach of the AETR principle” (2009) 34 E.L.R. 754, 764; see also Hillion, “Mixity and
coherence in EU External Relations” inMixed Agreements Revisited, 2010, p.112; and Neframi, “The Duty of Loyalty”
(2010) 47 C.M.L.R. 323, 341.
59Commission v Luxembourg (C-266/03) [2005] E.C.R. I-4805 at [40]–[51]; Commission v Germany (C-433/03)
[2005] E.C.R. I-6985 at [41]–[54].
60For an analysis of that issue see Cremona, “Extending the reach of the AETR principle” (2009) 34 E.L.R. 754,
762–763. Even though this case dealt with a non-binding proposal by Greece, she cautions about the over-interpretation
of the judgment since the ECJ was “careful to link the scope of the exclusivity principle to the scope of the Regulation
… and to match the national action in question to the purposes and structure of the Regulation when assessing its
effects” (at 763). However, in the later PFOS judgment, the Court could not rely on such a strict link to exclusivity
anymore.
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“Any breach by the Commission of Article 10 [TEC, now 4(3) TEU] cannot entitle a Member State
to take initiatives likely to affect Community rules promulgated for the attainment of the objectives
of the Treaty.”61
The Court reiterated thus that the duty of co-operation also binds the EU institutions and not just the
Member State. However, as Hillion notes, it does so with circumspection.62 In this specific case, the Court
considered that the Commission could have had an obligation of “best endeavours” by allowing the Greek
proposal to be discussed in the committee.63 In any case, there was in no event a clear result required from
the Commission.
However, the Commission’s (potential) wrong of course does not make Greece’s subsequent action
right, as the Court correctly observed. The Court has generally refused to accept any notion of obligations
under Union law operating on a reciprocal basis, including in the relationship between the Member States
and the institutions.64 But as Cremona rightly points out, this might lead to an unequal situation in terms
of the ability to seek remedies for a breach of the duty of co-operation. While the cases discussed in this
article show the wide range of Member State acts than can be successfully challenged before the ECJ by
the Commission, in IMO there was no legally reviewable act of the Commission that a Member State
could have brought before the Court under art.263 TFEU (ex art.230 TEC). In terms of a challenge for
failure to act under art.265 TFEU (ex art.232 TEC), the Commission (and other EU institutions) have
“broad discretion”65 and in any case the Member States must call upon it to act within a two-month period
(art.265(2) TFEU). Therefore, “both in legal and practical terms”,66 it is unlikely that Greece could have
enforced the Commission’s part of the duty before the Courts.
In sum, the ECJ considers that even when a Member State has complied with the duty of co-operation
in the sense of informing and consulting with the EU institutions, a lack of express authorisation by them
(in this case by the Commission) entails an obligation to refrain from acting. Although the ECJ recognises
that the Commission might have breached its own obligation under the duty of co-operation by refusing
Greece’s request to discuss the issue internally, it underlined that this fact does not authorise Member
States to breach it as well. While it is true that EU law does not favour countermeasures and reciprocity
in the relation between its different actors, it is also true that the ECJ legally cements the stronger pull
that the Commission wields owing to its agenda-setting powers vis-à-vis the Member States in the area
at hand.
In terms of the limits of the duty of co-operation, after IMO it might still have been said that such a
strict obligation for Member States not to speak up within international organisations was appropriate for
an issue falling within exclusive Union competence. The underlying logic of exclusivity necessarily
prevents Member States from acting outside the Union’s framework. Where the Union itself cannot act,
the Member States indeed act as “trustees” of the Union,67 and nothing more. Therefore any position they
wish to assume has to go through the Union’s internal procedures. If the European Union refuses to pick
up and voice the proposal externally, Member States have no longer the power to utter it individually.
Importantly, “acting” on the international scene does not only mean directly affecting common rules by
61Commission v Greece not yet reported at [26].
62Hillion, “Mixity and coherence in EU External Relations” in Hillion and Koutrakos,Mixed Agreements Revisited
(Oxford: Hart, 2010), p.113.
63 IMO (C-45/07) [2009] E.C.R. I-701 at [25]: “the Commission could have endeavoured to submit that proposal
to the Maritime Safety Committee and allowed a debate on the subject” (emphasis added).
64See as the seminal judgment Commission v Luxembourg and Belgium (Dairy products) (90/63 and 91/63) [1964]
E.C.R. 631 at [2]. See also Schermers and Waelbroeck, Judicial Protection in the European Union, 6th edn (The
Hague: Kluwer, 2001), pp.625–627.
65Cremona, “Extending the reach of the AETR principle” (2009) 34 E.L.R. 754, 766.
66Cremona, “Extending the reach of the AETR principle” (2009) 34 E.L.R. 754, 765.
67Cremona, “Member States as trustees of the Community interest” [2009] EUI Working Paper (Law) 17.
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actually assuming legal obligations (the classic ERTA effect), but also by setting “in motion such a
procedure” which is “likely”,68 somewhere down the road, to affect such rules.
The PFOS case: abstention also in areas of shared competence
In the Inland Waterways cases, by not consulting the EU institutions before ratifying and implementing
bilateral agreements, as well as by those acts themselves, Germany and Luxembourg breached their
obligations under what is now art.4(3) TEU. In the IMO case, Greece had indeed “endeavoured” to comply
with its duty of co-operation by consulting with the EU institutions before submitting a non-binding
proposal. However, since the issue fell within the European Union’s exclusive competence, Greece, too,
had violated the duty of co-operation as in those circumstances the duty was one of abstention—a duty
that could not be disposed of through information and consultation efforts.
For issues not falling under exclusive Union competence, however, until recently it seemed that such
a strict “duty to remain silent” would not apply. According to Cremona, commenting in the wake of the
IMO judgment,
“the position should be different in a case of shared competence, where the Member State remains
entitled to act as long as the Community has not acted.”69
Is shared competence therefore the “final frontier” for the “duty to remain silent”? In the PFOS case, the
Court’s answer to this question was a resounding “no”. As the Court’s judgment from April 2010
established, this does not represent a valid limitation either. This raises the question of where the scope
of the “duty to remain silent” actually ends.
This case concerned an infringement procedure launched by the Commission for a unilateral proposal
by Sweden to include certain environmentally harmful substances, more precisely perfluoroctane sulfonate
(PFOS), in the Annex of the Stockholm Convention on Persistent Organic Pollutants against a backdrop
of what seemed to be the absence of a clear Union position on the matter. The Stockholm Convention is
a mixed agreement (i.e. both the European Union and its Member States are parties) covering an area
which falls under the European Union’s shared competence.70 That means that in principle the Member
States also remain competent to act. Similar to Greece in the IMO case, Sweden consulted the EU institutions
on the possibility of a common proposal to list PFOS in the relevant Annex of the Stockholm Convention.
However, no agreement was reached within the Council. This was in September 2004. In March 2005,
the Council recommended that the European Union and its Member States propose up to three substances
before the first meeting of the Conference of the Parties to the Convention. The European Union and its
Member States ended up proposing two substances to the Stockholm Convention in May 2005, none of
them PFOS. In July 2005, the listing of PFOS in the Annex of the Stockholm Convention was once again
brought up by Sweden within the Council. However, no agreement was reached once again on this point.71
Eleven months after its initial proposal and after the European Union had already proposed the two other
substances to be included in the Annex of the Stockholm Convention, Sweden submitted “in its name and
68 IMO (C-45/07) [2009] E.C.R. I-701 at [25]; note also in this context that according to the Court’s Opinion in
Lugano: “[i]t is also necessary to take into account not only the current state of Community law in the area in question
but also its future development, insofar as that is foreseeable at the time of that analysis” to establish the scope of
Union rules; Opinion 1/03 on competence of the Community to conclude the new Lugano Convention on jurisdiction
and the recognition and enforcement of judgments in civil and commercial matters [2006] E.C.R. I-1145 at [126].
69Cremona, “Extending the reach of the AETR principle” (2009) 34 E.L.R. 754, 766.
70See Commission v Sweden Opinion of A.G. Maduro at [28].
71For the background of the case see Commission v Sweden at [29]–[49]. At the same time, negotiations went on
as to which substances to propose to the related, but distinct, Aarhus Protocol on Persistent Organic Pollutants, to
which the Union and some of its Member States are parties. For a subsequent meeting of the parties to the Stockholm
Convention, the Council approved a proposal to add another three substances, again none of them PFOS, at [43].
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on its own behalf a proposal to list PFOS in Annex A of the Stockholm Convention to the Secretariat of
that convention”.72
The Advocate General still made a theoretical distinction in his opinion between the language of
exclusive competence of IMO and the facts and issues of PFOS.73 The Advocate General stressed first
that also the EU institutions were bound by art.4(3) of the TEU. Furthermore, Sweden was indeed entitled
to propose the inclusion of PFOS in an Annex of the Stockholm Convention. However, A.G. Maduro
argued that the mixed character of the Convention qualifies the possibility for EUMember States to make
proposals under the Convention. In this regard, the Advocate General considered that Sweden’s actions,
even though they might not undermine the exercise of EU competence altogether, they might affect the
European Union’s internal decision-making process.74 According to the Advocate General:
“The implications of the duty of loyal cooperation are therefore twofold: first, that Member States
cooperate with the Community decision-making process; and, second, that they refrain from taking
individual action, at least for a reasonable period of time, until a conclusion to that process has been
reached.”75
A.G. Maduro thus makes a clear distinction the between the duty of best efforts (i.e for him the obligation
to co-operate within the EU decision-making process) and the duty to refrain from acting, and argues that
even though Sweden has complied with the first obligation it has not complied with the second. The
Advocate General opines that as long as the European Union’s internal processes are at work, Member
States should refrain from acting “for a reasonable period of time”. On the one hand, the Advocate General
is following what the ECJ argued in Inland Waterways as regards the establishment of a Union position
as the point of departure for triggering the duty of co-operation. On the other hand, he introduces for areas
of shared competence the idea of a limit to the obligation to refrain from acting whenever there is a
decision-making process going on. Otherwise put, there is a theoretical point in time when the “duty to
remain silent” ends, and the Member State would be allowed to speak up again. Accordingly, Sweden
should simply have waited. In casu, the Advocate General considered that waiting for 11 months since
the initial EU-internal proposal to include PFOS to the Annex of the Stockholm Convention was not a
reasonable period of time.
The Court, however, did not enter into the analysis of what would be a reasonable period of time for
Sweden to wait before being set free to act unilaterally. Instead, akin to the Inland Waterways cases, it
focused solely onwhether a “Community strategy” on the issue had emerged. In this regard, the Commission
claimed that PFOSwas not “a priority issue as regards the Stockholm Convention”, and that not to include
it was the result of a deliberate choice enshrined in a common position within the Council.76 Agreeing
with the Commission, the ECJ ruled that:
“It does not appear to be indispensable that a common position take a specific form for it to exist and
to be taken into consideration in an action for failure to fulfil the obligation of cooperation in good
faith.”77
72Commission v Sweden (C-246/07) April 4, 2010 at [40].
73Commission v Sweden (C-246/07) Opinion of A.G. Maduro at [26]–[31].
74Commission v Sweden (C-246/07) Opinion of A.G. Maduro at [43]–[47].
75Commission v Sweden (C-246/07) Opinion of A.G. Maduro at [49]. Similarly von Bogdandy and Schill, “Artikel
4 EUV” in Das Recht der Europäischen Union, margin No.99, arguing that any standstill effect of the duty of
co-operation can only be limited in time in areas of shared competence.
76Commission v Sweden (C-246/07) at [52].
77Commission v Sweden (C-246/07) at [77].
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Importantly, the Court deemed the common position to be that there was “no agreement on the substances
to be proposed and discussion of that issue was postponed”.78 Therefore one could not speak of a
“‘decision-making vacuum’”,79 but that instead a “common strategy not to propose” indeed existed.80
With PFOS the ECJ continues to broaden the starting-point of the Union’s course of action which
triggers the application of the duty of co-operation both from a temporal and material perspective. From
a temporal perspective, the duty is not only triggered when it has been decided that the Union will act
externally on a certain issue (as was the case in Inland Waterways), it is triggered at even earlier stages
of the decision-making process (like in IMO). Arguably, according to PFOS the duty of co-operation
applies from the moment an issue is discussed within an EU institution. This entails also a broader
understanding of what a Union position is. Before, i.e. according to Inland Waterways, the ECJ seemed
to view as the point of departure for Union action the moment the Commission makes a proposal to the
Council, even though the latter has not (yet) accepted it.81
In PFOS the ECJ identified the departure of Union action not in the adoption of an authorising decision,
or in a Commission proposal. Instead, the ECJ identified the departure of Union action from a bundle of
Council conclusions and minutes of meetings where references to the Stockholm Convention were made
or the issue of PFOS was discussed, without in fact reaching an agreement on whether to propose the
inclusion of that substance in the Annex of the Convention.82The Court concludes that this lack of agreement
at that point in time is proof that the European Union in fact had a strategy on PFOS, i.e. “a common
strategy not to propose” it for inclusion. Moreover, while showing how soon in time the duty can be
triggered, the Court refused to pick up the Advocate General’s point of establishing a (however distant)
point in time when it would cease to apply.
In terms of the material scope of the duty of co-operation, given that the issue was one of shared
competence, it could be expected that the Court would have followed its previous judgments (and the
Advocate General) on the interplay between shared competence and the duty of co-operation, in which
an obligation to inform and consult was still conceivable. Against such a standard, Sweden could have
been deemed to have informed and consulted with the EU institutions about its intentions of proposing
to include PFOS in the Annex of the Stockholm Convention in a satisfactory way, therefore not breaching
the duty of co-operation under art.4(3) TEU. At most, it could have ruled that Sweden did not wait long
enough before going it alone.
However, the ECJ here clearly refutes this less strict manifestation of the duty. The Court started its
reasoning with a statement on the general application of the duty as it had done before, and continued
with a reference to the IMO case on the different nature of the competence involved in PFOS, i.e. shared
instead of exclusive.83 But then, contrary to the Inland Waterways cases where it had remained ambivalent
about whether Member States had an obligation either “just” to inform and consult or abstain altogether
from acting, the ECJ ruled here that the duty of co-operation once it is triggered entails clearly an obligation
to refrain from acting.84
The ECJ’s reasoning makes it hard to see how PFOS differs from IMO in terms of the material extent
of the duty of co-operation. Member States are barred from acting even in such situations concerning
shared competence. This makes one wonder about situations in which Member States in matters of shared
78Commission v Sweden (C-246/07) at [86].
79Commission v Sweden (C-246/07) at [87].
80Commission v Sweden (C-246/07) at [89].
81Commission v Germany (C-433/03) [2005] E.C.R. I-6985 at [65]; Commission v Luxembourg (C-266/03) [2005]
E.C.R. I-4805 at [59]; Commission v Sweden at [74]. Also seeing such proposals as the point of departure, von
Bogdandy and Schill, “Artikel 4 EUV” in Das Recht der Europäischen Union, 2010, marginal No.98.
82Commission v Sweden (C-246/07) at [78]–[89].
83Commission v Sweden (C-246/07) at [71]–[72].
84Commission v Sweden (C-246/07) at [74] and [103].
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competence actually would be allowed to act. If the lack of a clear Union position bars Member States
here from acting independently, then a contrario, in order to act it appears that they would need some sort
of Union authorisation to do so notwithstanding intra-Union dissension. Even if the ECJ uses different
words, at the end it seems that it continues to speak the language of exclusive competence with regard to
the duty of co-operation. How different is in fact this need for a quasi-authorisation from formal
authorisations like the ones that followed theOpen Skies cases?85How can one make a distinction between
the need to ask for authorisation to make a proposal in matters of shared competence and an authorisation
to renegotiate a bilateral investment treaty falling under the Common Commercial Policy, i.e. an area of
exclusive competence?86 In both cases, regardless of the competence involved, in the absence of an express
authorisation, Member States have to remain silent.
The duty of co-operation and the “special-nature” CFSP
When discussing the limits of the duty co-operation, the special nature of the Common Foreign and Security
Policy (CFSP) should not remain unaddressed.87 Is it here perhaps that the “duty to remain silent” ends
and “best efforts” suffice to do justice to the obligations flowing from loyalty to the Union? The EU
Treaties point rather in the other direction. The formulation in art.24(1) TEU is strikingly comprehensive
in this regard, stating that EU “competence in matters of common foreign and security policy shall cover
all areas of foreign policy and all questions relating to the Union’s security …”.88 As we argued earlier,
where there is Union competence, there is a duty to co-operate. Furthermore, the Treaties contain numerous
specific emanations of loyal co-operation in the area of the CFSP. As an example, one should note the
first two indents of art.24(3) TEU:
“TheMember States shall support the Union’s external and security policy actively and unreservedly
in a spirit of loyalty and mutual solidarity and shall comply with the Union’s action in this area.
The Member States shall work together to enhance and develop their mutual political solidarity.
They shall refrain from any action which is contrary to the interests of the Union or likely to impair
its effectiveness as a cohesive force in international relations.”89
The duty of co-operation therefore does not seem to stop “at water’s edge”.90 However, even though it
applies as legally binding normative guidance for the European Union and its Member States, the crucial
distinguishing feature from the cases discussed earlier (all situated in the former “Community” sphere)
is the strictly limited jurisdiction of the ECJ to adjudicate in the realm of the CFSP.91 In addition, art.24(3)
TEU states that “[t]he Council and the High Representative shall ensure compliance” with the principles
of co-operation in the CFSP, leaving aside the Commission as the usual watchdog of the duty of
co-operation. In view of these restrictions, it is understandable that a case law as extensive as in the former
85These cases were launched by the Commission against the United Kingdom, Denmark, Sweden, Belgium,
Luxembourg, Austria and Germany. By way of example, seeCommission v United Kingdom (Open Skies) (C-466/98)
[2002] E.C.R. I-9427; [2003] 1 C.M.L.R. 6; see in detail C. Hillion, “A look back at Open Skies” in Bulterman et al.
(eds), Views of European Law from the Mountain (Alphen aan den Rijn: Wolters Kluwer Law & Business, 2009)
pp.257–265.
86Proposal for a Regulation of the European Parliament and of the Council establishing transitional arrangements
for bilateral investement agreements between Member States and third countries COM(2010) 344 final.
87On the “particularity of foreign affairs” in the EU context see D. Thym, “Foreign Affairs” Principles of European
Constitutional Law, 2010, pp.311–314, and the CFSP in particular, pp.330–338.
88See also art.2(4) TFEU.
89See also arts 28(3)–(5), 29, 32, 34 and 35 TEU.
90To use the expression by P. Eeckhout, Does Europe’s Constitution Stop at the Water’s Edge? Law and Policy in
the EU’s External Relations (Groningen: Europa Law Publishing, 2005).
91Article 24(1) TEU.
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“first pillar” on the nature and scope of the duty of co-operation in this area has not developed. Instead,
the deliberate restriction of jurisdiction by the “Masters of the Treaties” in the CFSP can be seen as an
indication of their will to be less constrained in their actions in this particular field. In other words, the
Member States aimed to thwart the emergence of any sort of “duty to remain silent” in the area of foreign
and security policy through constitutional design, in particular judicial restraint.
Two important exceptions qualify this restricted jurisdiction though, i.e. ensuring that the CFSP will
not affect the application of other areas of Union competence (and vice versa) (art.40 TEU), and reviewing
the legality of restrictive measures (art.275 TEU).92 Hence matters pertaining to the CFSP do not a priori
bar future Court rulings applying the “duty to remain silent” also to the CFSP. Against this backdrop, the
conclusion drawn by Hillion andWessel already in the pre-Lisbon era, namely that “[t]he potential impact
of the loyalty principle … on Member States’ freedom under the CFSP should not be underestimated”,93
remains all the more valid today.
Concluding observations: masters of two treaties, and two treaties only
Stepping back and contemplating the picture the Court has painted in its recent case law concerning the
duty of co-operation in external relations, we conclude that contrary to earlier ambivalence, it now has
revealed the wideness of the scope of the duty of co-operation in three directions. First, on the intra-EU
level, whereas previously the duty seemed to be triggered from the moment a concerted Union position
had been launched by a positive legal act (giving the Commission a mandate or at least an official
Commission proposal), now, after these cases, it has become unclear until which point Member States
would still be free to act. They must now be silent even before the Union has made up its own mind about
whether and when it is going to speak. The concept of a Union position has been broadened by the Court
so as to include situations in which the EU institutions have not reached a decision or choose not to discuss
an issue like in IMO. One might even say that, according to the ECJ, indecisiveness constitutes a valid
Union position or strategy.
Secondly, on the international level, merely submitting for consideration a non-legal proposal to a
technical committee already constitutes setting in motion a procedure that compromises both the division
of competences and the unity of international representation of the European Union. Even if the Member
State’s proposal pursues and respects Union interests (or admittedly what Member States consider to be
the Union’s interest), the fact that theMember State acted independently breaches the duty of co-operation,
regardless of whether it has informed and consulted with the Union and regardless of whether the Union
had a clear substantive position on the issue at the time of the proposal. Reticence on the international
plane therefore seems to be inherent in the task of being a good “trustee of the Union interest”.
Thirdly, the scope of the “duty to remain silent” seems to make the distinction between exclusive and
shared competence virtually irrelevant. Simply because a Member State still is competent about a matter,
it does not mean that it can speak up about it outside the European Union. As the recent case law shows,
it seems that Member States need a kind of EU authorisation in order to exercise “their share” of shared
competence.
Therefore, what is left for Member States to do on the world stage? Is there any situation in which a
Member State could open its mouth in the presence of Union competence (and ECH jurisdiction) but in
the absence of Union authorisation? According to the recent ECJ case law, we have doubts about that.
92Earlier on, the Court had already famously established in the Centro Com case that even when exercising
competence in the area of foreign and security policy, Member States have to respect (then) Community rules, R. v
HM Treasury Ex p. Centro-Com Srl (C-124/95) [1997] E.C.R. I-81; [1997] 1 C.M.L.R. 555 at [27].
93C. Hillion and R. Wessel, “Restraining External Competences of EUMember States under CFSP” in EU Foreign
Relations Law, 2008, pp.119–121.
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Hence the duty of sincere co-operation in external relations manifests itself indeed rather often as a duty
for the Member States to keep silent, unless told to speak by the EU institutions.
Stepping back further and taking into account the larger picture, two additional observations can be
made. First, the duty of co-operation has not only transformed formerly sovereign countries into EU
Member States which occasionally act as the Union’s trustees, but it has also turned these EU Member
States into “strange” subjects of international law,94 whose external relations are considerably restrained
by EU law obligations. Consequently, despite nominally remaining “sovereign” and “original” subjects
of international law, their behaviour is meticulously monitored by the Commission, and where necessary
(and possible) judged by the Court whenever they open their mouth when it is in the Union’s interest that
they remain silent. From a political point of view, this legal requirement reveals a great potential for
frustration when it leads to lock both the Union and the Member States into a state of inaction. How, one
is left to wonder, is the Union to attain its external objectives, apart from idle unity in representation, when
no one speaks up?
Secondly, this “strange” character not only of the Union but also of itsMember States on the international
scene as well as the seeming boundless nature of the loyalty the Member States need to show towards the
Union prompts a more general reflection of an old criticism of the Union’s “autonomous”, “constitutional”
legal order. This concerns the argument that this “constitution” remains after all a duo of international
treaties, and that ultimately theMember States remain the sovereignmasters over them. The Treaty reform
process and the various ratification problems the Lisbon Treaty encountered pointedly reminded us of
this.95 However, given the wide-ranging restrictions the duty of co-operation imposes on the Member
States internationally, it fosters the impression that they are no longer the true masters of many of the
other international agreements they concluded to the extent that the subject-matter of these agreements
has come to be covered by EU competence (either exclusive or shared) and ECJ jurisdiction. Here it is
the Union and its institutions that determine and monitor what the members can and cannot do. With the
unfolding of the wide scope of the duty of co-operation and the strict duties that ensue from it, theMember
States might well end up remaining masters of the EU Treaties, but of those only.
94B. De Witte, “The Emergence of European System of Public International Law: The EU and its Member States
as Strange Subjects” in J. Wouters et al. (eds), The Europeanisation of International Law (The Hague: T.M.C. Asser
Press, 2009), pp.39–54.
95See, e.g. M. Wendel, M. Belov and M. Angelov, “The Constitutional Paradigm revisited. Looking at the Lisbon
Treaty with the eyes of Magritte” in I. Pernice and E. Tanchev (eds), Ceci n’est pas une Constitution —
Constitutionalisation without a Constitution? (Baden-Baden: Nomos, 2009), pp.226–242.
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